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Abstract
This paper tests how well the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) performs to detect bid-
rigging cartels. In the case investigated in this paper, the bid-rigging cartel rigged all contracts during
the collusive period, and all firms participated to the bid-rigging cartel. The two econometric tests
constructed by Bajari and Ye (2003) produce a high number of false negative results: the tests do not
reject the null hypothesis of competition, although they should have rejected it. A robustness analysis
replicates the econometric tests on two di↵erent sub-samples, composed solely by cover bids. On the first
sub-sample, both tests produce again a high number of false negative results. However, on the second
sub-sample, one test performs better to detect the bid-rigging cartel. The paper interprets these results,
discusses alternative methods, and concludes with recommendations for competition agencies.
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1 Introduction
Bid-rigging cartels are a pervasive and a persistent problem as attested by the numerous case pros-
ecuted by competition agencies around the world.1 Switzerland is not an exception.2 At the inter-
national level, the OECD have dealt several times with this problematic.3 Fighting against these
harmful and ine cient practices should be one of the top priorities for competition agencies. If
leniency programs are surely an important tool to enforce law for competition agencies, they may
also have limits. Competition agencies should be more reactive, if not pro-active to deter and to
destabilize bid-rigging cartels.4 But, in order to react, competition agencies need an appropriate de-
tection method. Does such a method exist to detect bid-rigging cartels? And if so, is it an appropriate
instrument for competition agencies?
To study this question, researchers first need to have data from previous bid-rigging cases in order
to di↵erentiate competition from collusion. It is only with perfect prior information on collusion
that researchers are able to gauge the reliability of a detection method. Yet, we use in this paper
data drawn from a previous case in Switzerland, the Ticino’s bid-rigging cartel.5 In this case, the
bid-rigging cartel rigged all contracts during the collusive period, and all firms participated to the
bid-rigging cartel, without exception. Hence, the Ticino case represents an interesting laboratory to
perform experiments and to evaluate detection methods. But, which method should we evaluate?
The paper of Bajari and Ye (2003) is a seminal paper for methods to detect bid-rigging cartels.
Based on a first-sealed bid asymmetric procurement model, they formalize a method to detect and
to screen bid-rigging cartels in an ex ante analysis.6 Di↵erent papers try to replicate the method
1See, OECD, Ex o cio Cartel Investigations and the Use of Screens to Detect Cartels (2013),
(http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/exo cio-cartel-investigation-2013.pdf), and the Report on implementing the
OECD Recommendation (2016) (http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Fighting-bid-rigging-in-public-procurement-
report-2016.pdf)
2See Strassenbela¨ge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112), Elektroinstallationsbetriebe Bern (LPC 2009/2, pp. 196-222), Wet-
tbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Aargau (LPC 2012/2, pp. 270-425), Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen-
und Tiefbau im Kanton Zu¨rich (LPC 2013/4, pp. 524-652) and Tunnelreinigung (LPC 2015/2, pp. 193-245). Furthermore,
Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) investigates still three cases at the beginning of 2016.
3See, OECD, the Guidelines for Fighting Bid-rigging in Public Procurement (2009), the Rec-
ommendation on Fighting Bid-rigging in Public Procurement (2012), and the Report on imple-
menting the OECD Recommendation (2016) Documents are available at the OECD homepage
(http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/fightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm).
4See, OECD, Ex o cio Cartel Investigations and the Use of Screens to Detect Cartels (2013)
5See Strassenbela¨ge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112)
6An ex ante analysis is an analysis carried out, before the opening of an investigation. (See Imhof et al., 2015, for an ex
ante analysis.)
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proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) but they do not have reliable information on collusion, as we do.
Because they are not able to discriminate clearly between collusion and competition, none of them
can evaluate exactly how well any detection method performs. In this paper, we aim to fill this lack
of empirical validation, and we replicate the detection method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) on
the Ticino case. Because we have a perfect knowledge of collusion and competition, we can evaluate,
if it is an appropriate instrument for competition agencies to use in an ex ante screening analysis.
First, we estimate the reduced-form of the bid function following Bajari and Ye (2003). We find
that the estimates of the bid function for the cartel period are consistent with a competitive market.
This result suggests that the cartel somehow manages to imitate competition. Then, we apply the
two econometric tests proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) on a pairwise base: each test considers solely
two firms, called hereafter a pair of firms, or solely a pair.
The first test, the conditional independence test, checks if the bids are independent conditional
on some observable covariates. The null hypothesis of competition stipulates that the residues of firm
i, drawn from the estimation of the bid function, are uncorrelated with the residues of firm j . The
alternative hypothesis of collusion assumes that bids are not independent: the residuals are corre-
lated between colluding firms. In our case, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of competition
for 89% of the pairs of firms at 5% risk level, albeit we implement the conditional independence test
for the cartel period. Hence, the conditional independence test produces too many false negative
results because it should have rejected the null hypothesis of competition in favour of the alternative
hypothesis of collusion. In other words, we should find correlation between the residues of firms for
the cartel period but we do not: bids are independent for most of the pairs.
The second test, called the exchangeability of the bids, examines if firms react in the same way
considering their own costs. To put it di↵erently, if we permute the costs of firm i with the costs of
firm j , then firm i should submit the same bids as firm j . Formally, the null hypothesis of competition
specifies that the estimated coe cients of firm i do not di↵er from those of firm j . If the estimated
coe cients are not identical across firms, this may be indicative of collusion. In our case, we find
again too many false negative results for the cartel period: 68% of the pairs pass the test at 5% risk
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level. Therefore, a lot of pairs of firms react in the same way, when their own costs change: firms
seem to behave competitively during the cartel period.
Finally, we check the robustness of these false negative results by implementing both tests on two
di↵erent sub-samples. Cover bids may be less informative than the winning bids because they are, by
definition, fake bids: costs should less explain the cover bids than the winning bids. Therefore, if we
implement the tests only on cover bids, we should find more rejection. For the first sub-sample, we
consider only the pairwise observation, when firm i and firm j do not win the contract, respectively
when they both submit simultaneously a cover bid. Hence, the first sub-sample contains solely covers
bids, excluding all winning bids.7 We call this first sub-sample, the indirect cover bids sample, because
neither firm i nor firm j wins the contract, but they both submit a cover bid in favour of a third
firm. For this indirect cover bids sample, we do not find better results neither for the conditional
independence test nor for the exchangeability test: both tests produce yet again a high number of
false negative results.
For the second sub-sample, we consider solely the pairwise observation, where firm i wins the
contract and firm j submits a cover bid, or the inverse. We call this sub-sample the direct cover
bids sample, because firm i wins the contract whereas firm j submits a cover bid; respectively firm
j submits a intentional higher bid than firm i. Note also that the second sub-sample contains all
pairwise observation excluded in the first sample, so that the addition of the two sub-samples is
the whole sample. We implement only the conditional independence test. In contrast to all the
previous tests, we find a higher number of rejection: 69% of the pairs fail the test. This result is the
first result supporting the existence of the Ticino bid-rigging cartel; It suggests that the conditional
independence test is appropriate to detect bilateral agreements.
We discuss the results obtained, and we conclude that the failure of one test should be su cient
to classify a pair of firms as candidate for further investigation. Moreover, the tests suggest that
competition agencies should envisage to initiate a deeper investigation, if half of the pairs, or more,
fail one of the two tests proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003). Then, we compare the method of Bajari
7Note that all winning bids are the lowest submitted bids for each contract during the cartel period.
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with another method, based on simple statistical screens to detect bid-rigging cartels, proposed by
Imhof et al. (2015). We find that simple statistical screens are less data intensive and produce better
results for the Ticino case: we clearly observe the impact of collusion on the distribution of the
bids, and we find significantly fewer false negative results for the cartel period. We present also the
strengths of both methods, and how we could combine them to use each method strength.
This paper is related to the papers of Porter and Zona (1993, 1999) and Pesendorfer (2000). They
estimate the reduced-form of the bid function based on costs to illustrate the e↵ects of bid-rigging
practices. Using information drawn from previous cases, these authors demonstrate, first that col-
luding bidders do not fit basic economical logic: their bids are not related to their own costs. Second,
estimates for colluding bidders di↵er significantly from estimates for competitive bidders. However,
it is not possible to apply the method developed by these authors in an ex ante analysis; they aim to
proof the anti-competitive e↵ects of bid rigging, and for that purpose they need prior information
on collusion. In contrast to these authors, we do not intend to demonstrate ex post the e↵ects of a
bid-rigging cartel in this paper; we want to test in a natural experiment, if and how well the method
proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) would have detected the Ticino bid-rigging cartel in an ex ante
analysis.
Three papers apply the method developed by Bajari and Ye (2003). First, Jakobsson (2007) applies
only the test for the conditional independence to a Swedish database with prior information using
the spearman rank correlation as non parametric test. She finds that about 50% of the pairs fail the
test. Second, Chotibhongs and Arditi (2012a,b) implement both tests and find evidence of collusion
for a group of 6 firms. Three of these six firms are involved in bid-rigging cases or bid frauds.
Third, Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) assume that costs under competition must first-order stochastically
dominate costs under collusion, because collusion increases firm mark-up. Therefore costs under
competition must be higher than costs under collusion. Then, considering four potential colluding
bidders identified with the tests proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003), they test the first order stochastic
dominance with costs recovered under a competitive model against costs estimated with a collusive
model; they find no evidence for collusion. The estimation of the bid function is also related to the
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estimation of structural models for competition and collusion (see Baldwin et al., 1997; Banerji and
Meenakshi, 2004).
However, all these papers contrast strongly with very few papers using simple screens to detect
bid-rigging cartels (see Feinstein et al., 1985; Imhof et al., 2015; Imhof , 2017).
Section 2 introduces the asymmetric first-price procurementmodel. Section 3 recapitulates briefly
the case of the bid-rigging cartel in Ticino and the data used. Section 4 presents the estimation for the
reduced-form of the bid function. Section 5 implements the tests for the conditional independence
and for the exchangeability of the bids. Section 6 proposes a robustness analysis by implementing
the tests on two di↵erent sub-samples. Finally, section 7 discusses in details the results of the papers.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the asymmetrical procurement auction model drawn from Bajari and Ye
(2003). Using the properties derived from the equilibrium, established by the literature on asymmet-
rical auctions, they demonstrate that a set of specific conditions has to hold for a competitive model.
Based on these conditions, they formulate the tests for the conditional independence and for the
exchangeability of the bids. Then, recapitulating Bajari and Ye (2003)’s model allow us to describe
more precisely the conditions underlining the two tests, applied in the next sections.
Bajari and Ye (2003) consider a procurement auction model with N risk-neutral firms compet-
ing for a contract to build a single indivisible public work contract. Firms have independent cost
estimates, respectively, firm i knows its own cost estimate (ci ) but not its competitors’ (c i ). Cost
estimates ci are drawn from a cumulative distribution function Fi(ci ) with the associated probability
density function fi(ci ). Both Fi(ci ) and fi(ci ) are common knowledge among all competitive firms
participating to the auction.
They further assume first that for all i, the distribution of costs Fi(ci ) has the support [c¯
, c¯] and
that the associated probability density function fi(ci ) is continuously di↵erentiable. Second, for all i,
fi(ci ) is positive on its support [c¯
, c¯].
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The strategy function of firm i is a function Bi(ci ) which is assumed to be strictly increasing
and di↵erentiable on the support of ci for all i. We also suppose that its inverse bid function  i(bi )
is strictly increasing and di↵erentiable on the support of the bids. Then, given costs, cost function,
bids and strategic bidding function, Bajari and Ye (2003) express the expected profit function for firm
i as the probability of winning given the strategic bidding functions of competitors j times a certain
mark-up, captured by the di↵erence between the bid and the costs. The expect profit function ⇡i(.)
for firm i can be written as
⇡i(bi , ci ;B i ) = (bi   ci ) i(bi ), (1)
where
 i(bi ) =
Y
j,i
[1 Fj ( i(bi ))] (2)
is the probability of firm i to win the contract, i. e. to submit the lowest bid considering competi-
tors’ costs and competitors’ inverse bid functions, which can be expressed by Pr(cj >  j (bi )).
The equilibrium in pure strategies is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where the strategic function Bi(ci )
maximizes the profit function in bi for all i and ci in its support. First-order condition is given by the
following equation:
@
@bi
⇡i(bi , ci ;B i ) = (bi   ci ) 0i (bi ) + i(bi ) = 0, (3)
where i(bi ) is given by 2.
Rearranging the first-order condition, they formulate the following di↵erential equation for all i:
ci = bi   1P
j,i
fj ( j (bi )) 
0
j (bi )
1 Fj ( j (bi ))
. (4)
Lebrun (1996) andMaskin and Riley (2000b) demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium in pure
strategies, and the equilibrium bid function is strictly monotone and di↵erentiable. The uniqueness
of this equilibrium has been equally shown in the literature (see Maskin and Riley, 2000a,b; Lebrun,
1996, 2002).
After identifying the model, Bajari and Ye (2003) derived five conditions to be satisfied in equi-
librium by the distribution of bids Gi(b;z), where z is a set of observable covariates. Three conditions
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are classic and imply that first the support of each distribution Gi(b;z) is identical for all i. Second,
the equilibrium bid function must be strictly monotone. Third, boundary conditions for the bid
function have to hold in equilibrium.
Because of the model specification, they impose two additional conditions. From these two addi-
tional conditions, Bajari and Ye (2003) derive the two econometric tests to diagnose collusion. First,
firm i’s bid and firm j’s bid are independently distributed conditioned on a set of covariates z ob-
servable to all firms. Conditional independence can be expressed with the following equation:
G(b1, . . . , bN ;z) =
NY
i=1
Gi(bi ;z). (5)
Testing this equation directly with limited data is not a simple empirical implementation. How-
ever, we estimate the distribution of the bids in the next sections, by regressing a set of covariates z on
the bids. Then, we test if the residuals, obtained from the estimated regression, are correlated across
firms. If residuals are uncorrelated, then the distribution of the bids are independent conditional on
the observable covariates used.
The second condition added by Bajari and Ye (2003) postulates that the distribution of bids is
exchangeable in equilibrium. For any ⇡ and any index i, the following equality holds:
Gi(b;z1, z2, . . . , zN ) = G⇡(i)(b;z⇡(1), z⇡(2), . . . , z⇡(N )). (6)
This equation implies that if we permute the costs of firm i by ⇡, then the bids of firm i should
also be permuted by ⇡. Concretely, we test if the estimated coe cients of firm i from the estimated
regression do not di↵er from those of firm j . In section 4, we model the bid function with cost
variables as covariates z to explain the submitted bids. Then, we present the test procedures in
section 5.
These five conditions allow Bajari and Ye (2003) to formalize the two following theorems. First,
if the distribution of bids Gi(b;z) for all i is generated from a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then the set
of five conditions identified must hold. Second, if the distribution of bids Gi(b;z) satisfies the five
conditions, then it is possible to construct the distribution of costs Fi(b | zi ) that uniquely rationalizes
the observed bids Gi(b;z) in equilibrium. Therefore, the following equation estimates the cost for
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firm i given observables covariates z in equilibrium.
ci = bi   1P
j,i
gi (b;z)
1 Gi (b;z)
. (7)
Equilibrium assumes competition, and we can recover the costs of all firms i with equation 7, if
all firms i do not collude. If firms collude, we cannot recover the costs with equation 7. However, it
is still possible to reformulate equation 7 when collusion occurs. For example, equation 8 proposes
to rationalize the lowest bid submitted from the cartel, denoted c, and the bids of non-cartel firms,
denoted i. C depicts the cartel subset.
cc = bc   1P
j,i, j<C
gi (b;z)
1 Gi (b;z)
. (8)
If we consider equation 8 closer, we need non-cartel firms i to rationalize the costs for the lowest
bid submitted from the cartel. Without non-cartel firms i, the denominator of equation 8 would be
unfixed, and it would be impossible to recover the costs of the lowest bid submitted from the cartel.
With our data, we face such a problem, because all bids for the cartel period are rigged: we do not
have non-cartel firms i, because all firms participated to the bid-rigging cartel. This may question
the relevance of the model used. However, as section 6 shows, the set of covariates z explains the
distribution of the cover bids (excluding the lowest bids from the cartel). Therefore, cover bids have
still some informative value.
3 The Ticino’s bid-rigging cartel
The Ticino cartel has existed since the 50s.8 However, since the mid 90s, collusion has not been so
easily sustainable as it used to. Competition pressure, within cartel members, started to grow up,
and reached its peak in intensity in the year 1998. In fact, the growing competitive behaviour and
the risk of bankruptcy motivated cartel members to settle down an agreement at the end of 1998.
They applied this agreement called the convention9 from 1999 to April 2005, date to which the new
8Ticino is a Canton in Switzerland, which is comparable to a State.
9In Italian: la convenzione
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Price Index for Road Construction
revision of the Cartel Act in Switzerland entered in force with direct sanctions.10 During this period,
called hereafter the cartel period, all firms active in the road construction sector participated to the
cartel, and they rigged all contracts for road construction without exception. Therefore, the Ticino
cartel is certainly one of the most severe bid-rigging cartel, also called all-inclusive cartel because all
firms participated to rig every contract. It is also an excellent case to study collusion and to test how
well detection methods perform.
Close to the end of the cartel, local politicians went to COMCO because they began to suspect
prices to be exaggerated. COMCO investigated the prices for road construction, and found that the
price index for road construction was significantly higher in Ticino. In fact, as the price index for
the rest of Switzerland decreased, the price index for Ticino continued rising in 2002, as depicted on
figure 1.11 Finally, the bid-rigging cartel denounced itself in order to benefit immunity until April
2005.
The cartel convention was a written document, and instituted weekly mandatory meeting, at
which all firms active in the road construction sector participated. The cartel convention sanctioned
absence to these meetings without valid and legitimate reasons, and punished absent firms by pos-
10For COMCO decision, see Strassenbela¨ge Tessin (LPC 2008-1, pp. 85-112)
11Source: Swiss Federal Statistical O ce.
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sible loss of future contracts. In practice, it is unknown if such punishment took e↵ectively place.
In each meeting, firms had to announce every new construction contract from public procurement
authorities as every other private construction contract above 20’000 CHF. During these meetings,
firms discussed contract allocation among them and the bids to submit.
The cartel convention defined di↵erent criteria to allocate new construction contracts. As first
criterion, the free capacity of a participant firm was preponderant in the allocation mechanism.
Second, the location of the contract work played also a crucial role in the allocation mechanism
among participants, especially for contracts below 500’000 CHF. Third, firms considered also the
specialization of the participants to allocate contracts. Fourth, the convention privileged participants
first invited by private actors to estimate a quotation considering the other criteria. 12 The final
decision of contract allocation was adopted by a majority. In case of divergence, firms vote in secret,
except firms involved in litigation.
The Ticino bid rigging cartel never used side-payments, and is therefore a weak cartel (seeMcAfee
and McMillan, 1992, for the definition of a weak and a strong cartel). Following Pesendorfer (2000),
two elements allow a weak cartel to achieve e ciency as a strong cartel. First, there must be a lot
of contracts to allocate every year within the cartel members. As we can see from table 2, the high
number of contracts meets this first condition, with a total of 175 public contracts for the years 1999
to 2004.
Second, a RankingMechanism, as described by Pesendorfer (2000), should allocate contract among
cartel members. In the Ticino cartel, the cartel convention played the role of the Ranking Mechanism
described by Pesendorfer (2000). It forced cartel members to reveal their true preferences, systemati-
cally controlled by the allocation criteria of the cartel convention, in order to avoid adverse selection
problem. In fact, the cartel convention on its own searched to determine the bidder with the lowest
cost for a specific contract in order to maximize the ex ante payo↵ of the cartel.
After allocating contracts between cartel members, firms discussed prices. For public contracts,
12Estimating a quotation causes costs which are not recoverable if another firm wins the contract. To avoid such sunk
costs, the convention stipulated that the firm who first announced a private contract had the priority on this contract. It
fostered also the announcement of contracts because private contracts are more di cult to observe than public contracts.
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all involved firms had to calculate their bids before the meeting. The cartel member, chosen con-
sidering all criteria, revealed his price. All participants discussed then the revealed price, and they
determined together the best price to submit for the designated winner and the cover bids. Involved
participants could not renounce to submit a bid in public tenders; the convention made them submit
a bid, respectively a cover bid.
COMCO did not investigate how the cartel members determined the price for the designated
winner. However, it is likely that they should have used a rule or any other mechanism to determine
relatively quickly the price for the designated winner. In fact, without such a rule, discussions about
price could linger too much. One rule could be the following one: the designated winner revealed his
price and if the price was not exaggerated, he could submit the bid to this revealed price. Another
rule could be that every member revealed their prices and then they calculated the arithmetic mean
of all prices; the price of the designated winner could be this arithmetic mean.
If other cartel members had calculated a cheaper bid than the one determined in the discussion,
they inflated their bids by some factor to ensure that the designated cartel member would win the
contract. The convention stipulates that submitted cover bids should be calculated and justifiable
for each position on the bidding documentation provided by procurement agencies. Moreover, cover
bids should be high enough relative to the winning bid so that they would not be considered by
procurement agencies ensuring the rewarding of the contract to the designated winner.
At the end of the cartel, prices dropped significantly: they were suddenly 25%-30% cheaper than
engineer estimates13. It is interesting to note that engineers progressively endogenized the higher
cartel price, as proposed by Harrington and Chen (2006). Thus, this observation is an indication
to use with caution engineer estimates to normalize the bids to obtain the dependent variable for
econometric estimations.
COMCO condemned all involved firms rendering the decision in 2007 but did not pronounce
sanctions against them because the involved firms ceased illegal conducts before April 2005, date to
which the revised Federal Act on Cartels entered in force with a sanction regime after a transition
13See decision Strassenbela¨ge Tessin, LPC 2008-1, p. 103
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phase from 2004. 14 Because the Ticino road construction cartel was discovered before this date
and because the cartel stopped illicit infringements before the final transitory date of April 2005,
COMCO did not sanction the involved firms. If they had been sanctioned, they would have paid a
roughly CHF 30 mio penalty.
COMCO defined the relevant market as the market for road construction and pavement in Can-
ton Ticino with an upstream market for asphalt pavement material, which plays a strategic role on
the road construction and pavement industry. Asphalt pavement material constitutes of 95% of ag-
gregates and 5% of asphalt or bitumen and is a crucial input for covering and pavement works. It has
to be heated at a mixing plant in order to be mixed and transported quickly to the contract location
to cover the road before getting cold. Market specialists say that the duration of asphalt once mixed
is comprised between one hour and one hour and half; it is then possible to be operational in a radius
of 50-80 km from the production mixing plant.
Because its importance in pavement works and the necessity to transport it heated, pavement
material is typically a strategic input. This influences the market structure: firms try to integrate
vertically their production process by owning an asphalt mixing plant (see table 9 in Appendix, firm
3, 4, 5 and 6). Because the infrastructure for an asphalt mixing plant is important and expensive,
small and local road construction firms try to join their e↵ort in vertical integration by owning com-
monly asphalt production plants. In our case, twelve road construction firms own the two biggest
asphalt production plants with a capacity of 80% of the overall asphalt production market in Ticino.
This cross-ownership on the upstream market conditions the downstream market structure and
put serious entry barriers for new competitors because the convention included a clause foreclosing
the road construction market: it was forbidden to sell asphalt or other inputs for road construction
to third firm not involved in the convention.15 Then, the costs to enter the market were prohibitive
because any new entrant should build its own mixing plant. Second, the disciplinary e↵ect of mixing
plants was real and enormous. Defecting to the cartel, respectively not taking part to the convention
could have raised important di culties for a single firm considering that asphalt may account for
14Illegal infringements of antitrust laws before 2004 went generally unsanctioned in Switzerland.
15Gilo et al. (2006) show that cross-ownership may sustain collusion.
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50% to 80% of the price for pavement works.
3.1 Data
In the rest of this section, we discuss the data for the Ticino case. First, we present some summary
statistics. Second, we explain the variables used in the econometric estimation. Specifically, we detail
how we construct the variables distance and capacity. We use these variables as proxies for the firm
real costs in order to estimate the reduced-form of the bid function in the following sections. Note
also that other proxies exist to determine the bid function of each firm i as, for example, the wage
of workers, the cost for capital, the price of intermediary inputs (which play a central role in road
construction), the taxes paid by the firm. The frequent use of the capacity and the distance in the bid
function may be explained for practical reasons: they are simple to be observed and constructed.
Summary Statistics
Table 4 recapitulates briefly the database for the Ticino case. Altogether, the database contains 334
contracts from 1995 to April 2006. However, we have only the records of the tender opening for 238
contracts mainly from the year 1999 to 2006. Therefore, we can identify 1381 submitted bids mainly
for the cartel and post cartel period. The tender process follows a first-sealed bid auction, and the
tender opening means that at a fixed date, announced by the procurement procedure, public o cials
open the sealed bids received from the submitting firms. Then, they write the price for each bid and
the name of the bidders on a record. This record allows us to have basic information on the contract
and on the firms, like the contract location, bidders’ identity and location, prices for each bid.
Table 2 presents the amount of contracts in CHF tendered per year. For the years 1995, 1996 and
2006, we do not have all the contracts publicly tendered. However, we do have all public contracts
for the years 1997 to 2005 and we observe important variations of the amount tendered, especially
between the years 1997 to 2001. There is a maximal di↵erence of 23 million between the years 1998
and 1999 representing 45% of the maximal amount tendered per year. Major and regular contracts
tendered each two years explain these di↵erences.
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Table 1: General Descriptive Statistics
Number of tenders 334
Number of submitted bids 2179
Number of tenders with details 238
Number of identified bids 1381
Number of identified bids from individual firm 1100
Number of identified bids from consortia 281
Number of winning bids from individual firms 148
Number of winning bids from consortia 90
Table 2: Tenders per year
Year Contracts Amount
1995 7 16’365’378.95
1996 18 15’881’311.40
1997 50 42’929’902.85
1998 36 28’802’066.70
1999 28 51’896’534.75
2000 27 31’479’500.25
2001 24 46’762’575.10
2002 30 38’713’586.60
2003 21 38’985’740.80
2004 45 35’282’493.70
2005 35 20’926’231.70
2006 14 19’079’459.70
Total 334 387’104’782.50
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The sample is characterized by a very high degree of frequent interaction among the same firms.
In total, we record 24 firms in the sample but only 17 firms regularly submitted bids for covering
and pavement works in Ticino. Table 3 describes the number of bids per tenders for the period from
1995 to 2006. The modus is 4 bids, the mean is 6.5 bids and the median is 6 bids. Note that the
number of bids does not necessarily equal the number of bidders because of the possibility for firms
to build a consortium.16
Table 3: Bids Distribution
Number of bids 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total
Number of tenders 13 31 53 37 42 44 33 30 18 15 10 8 334
The Bids
In the econometric estimations, we take as dependent variable the natural logarithm of all submitted
bids LNBIDit for all firm i and for all contract t. It is worthy to note, that, in contrast to the literature
(see Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Aryal and Gabrielli, 2013),
we do not normalize the bids through the engineer estimates of each contract. First, we possess only
a few engineer estimates. Second, engineers endogenized gradually the increase in price, caused by
the cartel, exactly as predicted by Harrington and Chen (2006). Indeed, after the breakdown of the
cartel, prices fell 30% under those engineer estimates. Therefore, we would not recommend to use
them in our case. But, because we do not standardize the submitted bids, we estimate the regression
in the next section with robust variance clustered by firms to take account for heterogeneity.
The Distance
A larger distance between firms and contract location increases the costs, other things being equal,
and a rational firm should submit a higher bid in a distant location and a lower bid in a closer
location. Therefore, the distance should have a positive impact on the bid function of all firm i.
16A consortium is a joint bidding or a business combination: two bidders or more submit jointly a bid and execute the
contract together if they win.
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Usually, the literature confirms this positive relationship.
We use the number of kilometres calculated from Google Map between the contract location and
the firm place, which is the location indicated on the o cial record of the tender opening.17 Note
also that the distance changes, if the bid is submitted from the headquarters or from a firm subsidiary.
Then, we add 1 for all observations in kilometre to exclude 0 in order to take the logarithmic of the
kilometres.18 The variable distance is LDISTit = ln(kmit +1) for all firm i and for all contract t.
The construction of the distance raises some issues. First, some contracts have two di↵erent lo-
cations. We calculate the distance in kilometres for both locations and compute a simple mean for
the value of the distance per firm i. Furthermore, some contracts are provided every two years and
concern principally maintenance works in a particular region of Canton Ticino. We took then the
three most important locations situated in the designated region considering the importance of the
road network, and we compute again a simple mean for the distance.19
Second, the address of the firmmay not correspond with the exact location of the operation center
of the firm. We assume that the firm address, gathered from the o cial records of the tender opening,
corresponds with the nearest operation center for each firm. We cannot verify this information but
usually both locations correspond. Third, even if the distance between the operation center and
the contract location matters, the distance from the mixing plant to the contract location matters as
well. We have no information about the location where firms buy their inputs. Finally, note that the
distancemay capture other e↵ects like proximity to the market or to procurement agencies.
The Capacity of firms
The assumption for the capacity is the same for the distance: A firm with a full own capacity engaged
in current contracts should submit a higher bid (if it submits one at all) compared to a firm with a
greater free capacity. A firm with few contracts won should submit aggressive bids to win contracts
17Note that we also construct a variable for the travelling time based on Google, and we find the same qualitative results
for the regression in the next section.
18Kilometres equal zero if the contract location is in the same place than the firm location.
19We asked native people from Ticino to determine the three most important locations for the road network in a partic-
ular region.
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in order to fill its order backlog.
Capacity of firms is usually measured in the literature as the volume of contracts won from the
beginning of the year until contract t divided by the volume of contracts won during the entire
year. Unfortunately, such a measure of the capacity appears inappropriate for our case, since some
contracts last two years and not just one year in our data. Thus, the volume of contracts won by
each firm i fluctuate significantly per year. Nevertheless, we attempt to construct the capacity for one
year, as proposed by the literature, and we find insignificant estimates. We extend the capacity on
two years, and we find again no significant results. Intuitively, the strong fluctuating income for each
firm suggests to calculate the capacity in a di↵erent way, taking account for the dynamic evolution of
the contract volume won per firm.
In this paper, we calculate capacity by summing the contracts won for each firm i and for each
contract t. The value of the contracts won is discounted for all firms i by 10% for each month
except from 15th July to 15th August and from 15th December to 15th January. These periods are
known as vacation period for the construction industry and the activity is paused or significantly
reduced. This depreciation of 10% represents the amount of work completed by firms for each
month. Once we calculate the sum of the discounted value of all contracts won for all firms i, we
divide each observation for the capacity by the firm average turnover per year as stated in the COMCO
decision.20. Consequently, the capacity used in the regression varies from 0 to value over 1, because
the firm turnover fluctuates strongly over the year. Since we do not know the identity of the bidders
before January 1999, we cannot observe the capacity. Therefore, we assume that all firms start in
January 1999 with a capacity equal to the half of its average turnover per year. The first observation
for the capacity variable for all firms i takes the value of 0.5. We denote it CAPit for all firms i at the
time of contract t. Note also that we exclude the year 2004 for the cartel period because we do not
have precise information about the date for 20% of the contracts. The whole cartel period sample,
used in the regression in the next section, contains all tenders from 1999 to 2003.
Another problem rises from the fact that we observe only a portion of the market and not the
20See, Strassenbela¨ge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, p. 99).
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overall market. In fact, firm turnovers, observed in the COMCO decision, constitute about 60% to
80% of the market volume. In order to have a perfect measure of the capacity variable, we should
ask firms to give us a list of all contracts completed per year. If such demand is realistic during an
investigation, it seems however unrealistic during an ex ante analysis. So, if the o cial records of the
tender opening are insu cient to construct the capacity variable, then this restriction may certainly
compromise the use of the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) during an ex ante analysis to
screen for collusion. However, as presented in the next section, the capacity variable CAPit provides
good and coherent results.
Strategic Interaction Variables
We create two variables to take account for the strategic interaction between firms. The first variable
is the minimal distance among rivals, noted LMDISTit for each firm i at contract t. We expect that
theminimal distance among rivals a↵ects positively the bid of firm i. The intuition is the following: if
firm i knows that all its rivals are very distant from the contract location, it might raise its bid because
it assumes that competition softens. The second variable is the minimal used capacity among rivals,
notedMCAPit for each firm i at contract t. We expect that the minimal capacity among rivals a↵ects
positively the bid of firm i. The intuition is the same as for the minimal distance among rivals. If
firm i knows that all potential rivals have full capacity engaged in di↵erent contracts, it might raise
its bid because competition for the contract will be less fierce.
Consortium
Consortium raises a next concern. Each consortium is a business combination of multiple firms
(in general 2 or 3 firms). Usually, a consortium is organized for one contract, but, in our case, we
find regularly the same consortia composed by the same set of firms. So, we identify these regular
consortia with an identification number as for the individual firms. We give to these regular consortia
the identification numbers from 21 to 26. Note also we give the value of 0 for irregular and occasional
consortia.
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Moreover, we consider uniquely the minimum value of the firms in the consortium to determine
the cost variables. This is justified for two reasons: first the convention stipulates this mechanism of
the minimum value in order to allocate contracts between di↵erent consortia. Second, the purpose
of a consortium usually consists of circumventing capacity restrictions or any other disadvantages.
Because of this basic economic justification for consortium, the cost variables of the consortium solely
take the minimum value of the costs from firms jointed in the consortium. Table 4 provides basic
descriptive statistics for the cartel and post cartel period.
Table 4: Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics for the Cartel Period
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
LNBID 13.57 1.12 9.99 15.65 778
LDIST 2.83 1.12 0 4.60 778
CAP 0.54 0.27 0 1.45 778
MLDIST 1.95 1.09 0 4.47 778
MCAP 0.25 0.20 0 1.11 778
Descriptive Statistics for the Post Cartel Period
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
LNBID 13.12 0.88 11.03 15.04 226
LDIST 2.93 1.12 0 4.58 226
CAP 0.42 0.21 0 1.07 226
MLDIST 2.14 1.21 0 4.42 226
MCAP 0.18 0.13 0 0.68 226
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4 Estimating the Bidding Function
As explained in section 2, it is convenient to use a regression analysis in order to test for the condi-
tional independence and for the exchangeability of the bids. The related papers in the literature gen-
erally estimate a panel model to analyse the structural relationship between the observable covariates
z and the bids (see Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Jakobsson, 2007;
Chotibhongs and Arditi, 2012a,b; Aryal and Gabrielli, 2013). Then, we formulate the following panel
model:
yit = x
0
it  + f
0
it↵ + "it . (9)
In this equation, xit include K estimators, and f
0
it↵ capture the individual fixed e↵ects including
a constant term, where i is the subscript for firms and t for contracts. yit is the logarithm of the bids,
submitted by firm i for contract t.
In our case, the exogenous variables xit are the cost variables presented in the previous sec-
tion, namely the distance (LDISTit), the capacity (CAPit), and the strategic interaction variables
(LMDISTit and MCAPit). If LDISTit and CAPit vary for all firms i and for all contract t, each
LMDISTit and MCAPit solely take two values per contract t. For example, the nearest bidder’s
LMDISTit takes for contract t the value of the second nearest bidder for contract t, but for all other
bidders (excluding the nearest bidder) LMDISTit takes the value of the nearest bidder for contract t.
Note also that these cost variables are solely proxies for the firm real costs. Again, because we repli-
cate in this paper the detection method, proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003), we consider the functional
reduced-form of the bid function and the cost variables as given. Dummies for contracts (↵t) and for
firms ( i ) capture the fixed e↵ects.
Based on these cost variables and fixed e↵ects, we estimate the following panel equation, with
robust variance clustered by firms:
LNBIDit =  0 + i +↵t +  1LDISTi,t +  2CAPi,t +  3LMDISTi,t +  4MCAPi,t + ✏it . (10)
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Empirical Results
Table 5 reports the estimation of the previous equation for the cartel period and the post cartel pe-
riod. For the cartel period, we use in the estimation 130 dummies for contracts (↵t), and 23 dummies
for firms ( i ). We have a total of 778 observations and 158 regressors.
The estimated coe cients for the distance (LDISTit), the capacity (CAPit), and the minimal ca-
pacity (MCAPit) used among rivals are positive and significant. These results are coherent with the
expected behaviour of firms in a competitive environment. If, all things being equal, LDISTit of firm
i increases by 1%, it raises firm i’s bid by 0.79%. The same yields for the firm capacity: if firm i’s
CAPit engaged in previous contracts increases, all things being equal, then firm i submits a higher
bid. This consistent result also supports the construction of the variable CAPit , discussed in the
previous section.
Turning to the strategic interaction variables, we find that the minimal distance among rivals is
not significant. However, the minimal used capacity among rivals (MCAPit) is significant and has
even a stronger positive e↵ect on firm i’s bid than the own used capacity. Intuitively, if firm i knows
that the other firms have already a high capacity engaged in other contracts, it submits a higher bid
assuming that competition is soften, because the other firms have too much capacity used to bid
aggressively. The fixed e↵ects for contracts (↵t) and for firms ( i ) are also significant. Moreover, we
notice that the R2 is very high. This can be common for a panel model, and also implies that the
reduced-form of the bid function explains almost all variation observed in the bids. If we retrieve
the fixed e↵ects for contracts (↵t), the Adj.R2 decreases to 0.3534. To sum up, all these results rather
depict a behaviour fitting a competitive environment, although the estimations are made for the
cartel period.
For the post cartel period, we use a total of 63 regressors including 39 dummies for contracts (↵t),
and 19 dummies for firms ( i ). With 224 observations, we have 3.5 time fewer observations than the
cartel period sample. All variables are insignificant in the estimation of equation 10. Moreover, we
notice that the standard deviation for all variables is roughly 10 times higher than for the cartel pe-
riod. This means that the estimators are imprecise, and this phenomenon explains, at least partially,
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why the estimators are insignificant. The small sample size and the transition phase, from a cartel to
a more competitive equilibrium, may explain this inaccurate estimation. Thus, even if we replicate
the econometric tests on the post cartel sample for comparison purpose, we must interpret them
with a certain caution. Finally, the R2 is again very high, although all variables are insignificant. This
suggests that the high number of dummies compared to the sample size explains mostly the high R2.
Again, R2 shrinks to 0.2922 without the fixed e↵ects for contracts (↵t).
Table 5: OLS Estimation for the Reduced-Form Bid Function
Variable Cartel Period Post Cartel Period
C (constant) 13.525*** 12.8866***
(0.0159) (0.1325)
LDIST (own distance) 0.0079*** 0.0258
(0.0025) (0.0212)
CAP (own used capacity) 0.019*** 0.0844
(0.0062) (0.0635)
LMDIST (minimal distance among rivals) -0.0012 0.028
(0.0041) (0.0322)
MCAP (minimal used capacity among rivals) 0.0429** 0.2709
(0.0208) (0.2416)
Dummies for contracts 130 39
Dummies for firms 23 19
Sample Size 778 224
Adj.R2 0.9995 0.9852
Where ***, **, * denote significance level at 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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5 Testing for collusion
In this section, we implement the tests for the conditional independence and for the exchangeability
of the bids. In order to implement these two econometric tests, we estimate the same equation as
equation 10 but we allow coe cients to vary across firms i. This is necessary if we want to implement
the test of the exchangeability of the bids. All tests presented hereafter are based on the following
panel equation:
LBIDit =  0 + i +↵t +  1,iLDISTi,t +  2,iCAPi,t +  3,iLMDISTi,t +  4,iMCAPi,t + ✏it . (11)
Note also that in the rest of this section, we present results not only for a standard risk level of
5%, but also for a risk level of 10%. As explained in the introduction, we might have a problem of
false negative results. This means that the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of competition in
favour of the alternative hypothesis of collusion, although they should reject it because of the bid-
rigging cartel. Then, a simple way to analyse this problem of false negative results is to raise the test
risk level at 10%. Because, this implies logically to raise the risk of false positive results, we would
not recommend to raise it in other cases, especially in an ex ante screening activity. However, our
case is special, and because we have a perfect information on the Ticino bid-rigging cartel, we cannot
make any mistakes, if we reject the null hypothesis of competition for the cartel period. To sum up,
presenting the results for a risk level at 10% allows us to discuss the sensitivity of the tests.
5.1 Test for the Conditional Independence
After estimating the equation 11, we test if the residuals of firms i and j are correlated. If the resid-
uals are uncorrelated between firms i and j , their bids are independent conditional on the observed
cost variables and the fixed e↵ects included in the regression. However, if we find that residuals are
correlated, bids are not independent: we can reject the null hypothesis of competition, depicted by
the Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric procurement model. Formally, the null hypothesis is the
following:
H0 : ⇢ij = 0, (12)
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where ⇢ij is the Pearson correlation coe cient. We perform the test only if there is at least five
pairwise observations for a pair of firms. This means that both firms submit simultaneously a bid
for five contracts. If r is the coe cient of correlation calculated from the data and n the number of
pairwise observation for each pair (where n   5), we apply the following Fisher Z transformation:
Z =
1
2
ln
1+ r
1  r , (13)
which is approximatively normal with
µZ =
1
2
ln
1+ ⇢
1  ⇢ and  Z =
1p
n  3 (14)
If we normalize Z in order to obtain the standard normal distribution, we have
z = (Z  µZ )
p
n  3, (15)
where µZ = 0 under the null hypothesis, i. e. ⇢ = 0. The test statistic is then Z
p
n  3.
For the cartel period, we test 133 pairs presented in table 10 in appendix and we reject the null
hypothesis at 5% risk level for 15 pairs, at 10% for 24 pairs. The failure proportion is 11% and 18%,
respectively. This result is surprising because it suggests that false negative results are considerable.
For the post cartel period, we apply the test on 47 pairs presented in table 11 in appendix; 7 pairs
fail the test at 5% risk level, 24 pairs at 10%. The failure proportion is 15% and 21%, respectively.
This result is confusing because we find slightly more rejection for the post cartel period than for the
cartel period. We would have expected the contrary.
5.2 Test for the Exchangeability
The test for the exchangeability of the bids examines if the coe cients estimated in equation 11
are identical between firms. If they are identical, it means that firms react in the same way based
on their own costs. In other words, if we permute the costs of firm i with the costs of firm j , then
firm i should submit the same bids as firm j . The null hypothesis of competition specifies that the
estimated coe cients of firm i do not di↵er from those of firm j . Formally, the null hypothesis for
the exchangeability of the bids is the following:
H0 =  ki =  kj 8i, j, i , j, and 8k = 1, · · · ,4. (16)
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The test is implemented with the following F-statistic
F =
(SSRC   SSRU )/J
SSRU/(N   k) , (17)
which has an F-distribution with parameters (J, N-k) under the null hypothesis, where J is the num-
ber of constraints, N the sample size and k the number of regressors.
Again, we implement the test solely on pairs of firms, which bid simultaneously at least for five
common contracts, respectively with five pairwise observations for each pair. Table 14 in appendix
shows the results for 133 pairs. We find that 42 pairs fail the test at 5% risk level and 58 at 10%. The
failure proportion is 32% and 44%, respectively. Failures are more important for pairs with fewer
observations. The pairs failing the test at 5% have on average 14 pairwise observation, whereas the
pairs passing the test have on average 19 pairwise observations.
Then, we test the exchangeability of the bids for the post cartel period. Table 15 in appendix
recapitulates the results for 47 pairs of firm. We find that 4 pairs fail the test at 5% risk level and 8
at 10%. The failure proportion is 9% and 17%, respectively.
To sum up, the test for the exchangeability of bids performs better, because it produces fewer false
negative results than the test for the conditional independence. Yet, false negative results remain
important because more than half of the pairs pass the test, although they should fail. Furthermore,
we also observe that the number of failure decreases for the post cartel period. This result is logical
because, if the test of exchangeability is correct, we expect that the number of failure decreases in a
more competitive market.
If we consider the simultaneous application of both tests at 5% risk level, we find that only 5
pairs fail both tests and 53 pairs fail solely one of them. The failure proportion is 4% and 40%,
respectively. At 10% risk level, we find that solely 9 pairs fail both tests and 73 pairs fail one of
them. The failure proportion is 7% and 55%, respectively. This result suggests that the failure of
one test should be su cient to raise concerns about the existence of bid-rigging cartel. We discuss it
deeper in section 7.
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Table 6: Summary of Econometric Tests
Summary of the Tests on 133 Pairs for the Cartel Period
Test Risk Level Failure % of Failure
Conditional Independence ↵ = 0.05 15 11 %
↵ = 0.1 24 18%
Exchangeability ↵ = 0.05 42 32%
↵ = 0.1 58 44%
Fail one test ↵ = 0.05 53 40%
↵ = 0.1 73 55%
Fail both tests ↵ = 0.05 5 4%
↵ = 0.1 9 7%
Summary of the Tests on 47 pairs for the Post Cartel Period
Test Risk Level Failure % of Failure
Conditional Independence ↵ = 0.05 7 15%
↵ = 0.1 24 21%
Exchangeability ↵ = 0.05 4 9%
↵ = 0.1 8 17%
Fail one test ↵ = 0.05 11 23%
↵ = 0.1 18 38%
Fail both tests ↵ = 0.05 0 0%
↵ = 0.1 0 0%
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6 Robustness Analysis
In the previous section, we test for collusion, and we find a high number of false negative results.
These results are erroneous, and they contradict the existence of the Ticino bid-rigging cartel. Thus,
we examine in this section, if these results are robust only for the cartel period with two di↵erent
sub-samples, composed by cover bids. We use cover bids, because they are less informative than the
cartel winning bids; Cover bids are, by definition, fake. Then, we could assume that cover bids are
less connected with costs than the cartel winning bids. If this is true, we should therefore find more
rejection for these two sub-samples, respectively fewer false negative results.
For the first sub-sample, we consider only the pairwise observation, when firm i and firm j submit
both cover bids. We call this first sub-sample, the indirect cover bids sample, because neither firm i
nor firm j wins the contract, but they both submit a cover bid in favour of a third cartel member.
Hence, the indirect cover bids contain solely cover bids, excluding all winning bids. Note also that,
for the cartel period, all winning bids are the lowest submitted bids for each contract.
For the second sub-sample, we consider solely the pairwise observation, where firm i wins the
contract and firm j submit a cover bid. We call this sub-sample the direct cover bids sample, because
firm i wins the contract whereas firm j submit a cover bid; respectively firm j direct cover firm i.
Note also that the second sub-sample contains all pairwise observation excluded in the first sample,
so that the addition of the two sub-samples produces the whole sample.
In the following, we implement the test for the conditional independence and for the exchange-
ability of the bids on the indirect cover bids sample. Then, we apply solely the conditional indepen-
dence test on the direct cover bids sample.
6.1 Testing Collusion for the Indirect Cover Bids Sample
6.1.1 The Conditional Independence Test
By analyzing the residuals of the regression from equation 11 for the cartel period, we find immedi-
ately that the residuals of the winning bids are significantly lower than the residuals of the cover bids.
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Table 7 shows that the simple mean is -0.0277 for the winning bids and 0.0055 for the cover bids,
with a standard deviation of 0.0187 and 0.0164, respectively. To sum up, the residuals of the winning
bids are in average 5 times lower than those of the cover bids with an approximative equal spread.
In other words, the residuals of the cover bids first order stochastically dominates the residuals of
the winning bids. This important di↵erence between the empirical distribution of both residuals
may influence notably the estimated Pearson correlation coe cient. Then, it might be interesting
to verify whether the results for the conditional independence test change, if we consider solely the
residuals for the cover bids.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics according to the Type of Residuals
Mean St. Dev. Min Max N L. Quartile Median U. Quartile
Resid. Cover Bids 0.0055 0.0164 -0.0473 0.0763 649 -0.0045 0.0042 0.0151
Resid. Winning Bids -0.0277 0.0187 -0.0711 0.0262 129 -0.042 -0.0281 -0.0158
To implement the test, we use the same residuals of equation 11 from section 4, but we suppress
the residuals of the winning bids for each contract. We calculate the Pearson correlation coe cient
and use, as in section 4, the Fisher transformation. Table 12 in appendix recapitulates the results.
The tests reject the null hypothesis for 14 pairs at 5% risk level and for 25 pairs at 10%; the failure
proportion is 15% and 26%, respectively. If we consider the pairs composed solely by individual
firms, we reduce the sample on 83 pairs, and we obtain 10 rejections at 5% risk level, 21 rejections at
10%; In sum, we notice approximatively the same proportion of failure (12% and 25%) for individual
firms. Moreover, the proportion of failures for the conditional independence test does not change
with this sub-sample. As for the whole sample of the cartel period, we find again too many false
negative results.
6.1.2 The Test for the Exchangeability of the Bids
To implement the tests for exchangeability of the bids, we suppress all winning bids for the cartel
period sample, and we estimate equation 11 again. We apply this test, only if we have at least five
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pairwise observations for the two firms; this means if both firms participate at least for five common
contracts, each firm submitting five cover bids in favour of a third cartel member.
The motivation to reduce the sample solely on the indirect cover bids is di↵erent from the reason
mentioned for the conditional independence test. Looking at figure 2 drawn from Imhof et al. (2015),
we observe an important gap between the winning bids and the cover bids. In fact, the average gap
is roughly 5%. However, we remark immediately from figure 2, that the gaps are smaller between
the cover bids. This pattern is observable for the majority of the contracts during the cartel period
(see Imhof , 2017). Therefore, if cover bids are very close, and if costs are di↵erent among firms, then
the estimated coe cients of equation 11 could be di↵erent across firms. In other words, we expect a
greater number of failure for this test.
Figure 2: Typical Cover Bidding Mechanism in Ticino
Table 8 presents the results for the estimation of equation 11 for the indirect covers bids sample.
We note that all variables are positive and significant. The distance has virtually the same e↵ect on
the bids as shown for the whole cartel period sample: if, all things being equal, the distance of firm i
increases to 1%, it raises firm i’s bid by 0.75%. The own used capacity and the minimal used capacity
among rivals have a weaker e↵ect on the bids compared to the whole cartel period sample. They are
significant only at 10% risk level. We observe interestingly that the minimal distance among rivals
is positive and significant at 10% risk level, whereas it is not significant for the whole cartel period
sample. The R-squared is also higher. This is certainly explained by the fact that we have fewer
observations and almost the same number of regressors. The results of this regression may surprise:
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we would have expected to find less consistency with a rational economic behaviour for the indirect
cover bids sample. On the contrary, these results suggest that costs explain somehow the cover bids.
Table 8: OLS Estimation of the Reduced-Form Bid Function for the Cover Bids
Variable Cover Bids
C (constant) 13.4877***
(0.0129)
LDIST (own distance) 0.0075***
(0.002)
CAP (own used capacity) 0.0092*
(0.0047)
LMDIST (minimal distance among rivals) 0.0066*
(0.0034)
MCAP (minimal used capacity among rivals) 0.0337*
(0.0181)
Dummies for contracts 130
Dummies for firms 22
Sample Size 645
R2 0.9998
Where ***, **, * denote significance level at 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Table 16 in appendix presents the results of the tests for 96 pairs. We find that 19 pairs fail at
5% risk level and 28 at 10%. The failure proportion is 20% and 29%, respectively. Then, the portion
of pairs, failing the test of exchangeability for the indirect cover bids sample, decreases by 12% and
15%, respectively.
This result surprises again because we would have expected to find more failures for this sub-
sample. We explain this result by two causes, which are mutually non-exclusive. First, the costs for
the cover bids do not di↵er as much as we could have expected. However, if they di↵er, they enter
in a symmetric way in the firm bid function. Second, firms gathered together each week, and they
discussed extensively the bids for public contracts, as it is stated in the cartel convention. Regular
discussions could explain why costs, if they di↵er, enter in a symmetric way in the firm bid function.
Still, indirect cover bids fail less tests for the exchangeability than the whole cartel period sample.
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We would have expected the contrary. In any case, this result confirms again the high number of
false negative results, observed for the whole cartel period sample.
6.2 Testing Collusion for the Direct Cover Bids Sample
We turn now to test the conditional independence test on the direct cover bids sample. We are
interested to analyse the residuals between the winning bids and the losing bids, where firm i wins
the contract and firm j submit a cover bid. In fact, we postulate that a significant di↵erence between
the two types of residuals, as observed with simple descriptive statistics in 7, may produce a strong
correlation pattern.
Again, we calculate the Pearson correlation coe cient and use, as in section 4, the Fisher trans-
formation. Table 13 in appendix presents the results. We consider again all pairs with at least 5
simultaneous bids, and we retain 35 pairs for the direct cover bids sub-sample. As expected, 24 pairs
reject the null hypothesis at 5% risk level, 28 at 10%. The proportion of failing pairs is 69% and
80%, respectively; we find also strong negative correlation for the failing pairs. The test produces
substantially fewer false negative results for the direct cover bids sample, and is consistent with the
Ticino bid-rigging cartel.
Intuitively, we can explain this phenomenon on the basis of figure 3 depicting the pairwise residu-
als of firms 9 and 15 for the whole cartel period sample, where both firms bid for the same contracts.
We di↵erentiate the type of cover bids between indirect and direct cover bids, represented on the
figure by circles and crosses, respectively.
In the previous section, we found that pair (9,15) had 62 simultaneous bids with a non significant
correlation of  0.0595; the pair does not fail the conditional independence test. Considering only
the indirect cover bids (circles on the figure), we find 50 simultaneous (indirect) cover bids with a
significant positive correlation of 0.3498. However, if we restrict the sample solely on the direct cover
bids (crosses on the figure), we observe 12 simultaneous bids and a significant negative correlation
of  0.8866.
In fact, the positive correlation from the indirect cover bid sample cancels the negative corre-
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lation from the direct cover bid sample. Because of this antagonistic e↵ect, the correlation for the
whole cartel period sample is not significant. The pair passes the test, whereas we expect it to fail.
This phenomenon is common for many pairs, which pass successfully the test of the conditional in-
dependence for the whole cartel period sample. This result indicates that the test of the conditional
independence is better designated to detect bilateral agreement and not an all-inclusive bid-rigging
cartel, as the Ticino case. We discuss this result in the next section.
Figure 3: Pairwise Residuals of firm 9 and 15
7 Policy Implication for Competition Agencies
In this section, we discuss the high number of false negative results. Then, we address the ques-
tion of classifying a pair of firms as potential cartel, if the pair fails solely one test or if it fails both
tests. In other words, is the failure of one test a su cient condition to alarm competition agencies?
Second, we compare the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) with a di↵erent method devel-
oped by Imhof et al. (2015) to screen for bid-rigging cartels. From this comparison, we deduce some
recommendations for competition agencies.
Based on the results of the previous sections, we show that the method of Bajari and Ye (2003)
produces too many false negative results for the Ticino case. In statistics, a false negative result is
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an error of type II: the test should reject the null hypothesis but it does not reject it whereas the null
hypothesis is definitively false. In our case, the null hypothesis is competition for both econometric
tests, and we do not reject it for a large percentage of pairs for both tests, although we implement the
tests for the cartel period. Again, we remind the reader that the bid-rigging cartel in Ticino rigged all
contracts for the cartel period, and all firms participated to the bid-rigging cartel, without exception.
Certainly, we study with the Ticino case a bid-rigging cartel of the worst kind. Therefore, considering
the severity of the bid-rigging cartel, how can we explain the high number of false negative results
observed?
Considering the high number of false negative results, we suggest first a data-related explana-
tion. The data may be imprecise, or the construction of the variables incorrect. However, incorrect
data or miss-constructed variables should rather contribute to reject the null hypothesis of competi-
tion. It would be very unlikely to have incorrect data or miss-constructed variables fitting the strong
hypotheses of Nash equilibrium in a first-sealed bid asymmetric procurement model. Moreover, the
results of the panel estimations contradict also this conjecture of data imprecision: if data or variables
were incorrect, it would be again very unlikely to find that firms bid following a rational economical
behaviour. Finally, one can attempt to put in question the assumed reduced-form of the bid function.
Yet, the literature has well established the empirical identification for the reduced-form of the bid
function used in this paper (see Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003;
Jakobsson, 2007; Chotibhongs and Arditi, 2012a,b; Aryal and Gabrielli, 2013). In any case, if the data
used in this paper is insu ciently accurate, it means that the o cial records of the tender opening
are not su cient to construct the variables for the bid function. Then, the data requirement to meet
is too high, if a competition agency wants to implement ex ante the econometric tests proposed by
Bajari and Ye (2003), based only on the o cial records of the tender opening.
After excluding the date-related explanations, we turn now to discuss model-related causes for
those false negative results. First, if firms pass the two econometric tests, although they collude on
all contracts, it might imply that they manage to pass through the tests proposed by Bajari and Ye
(2003). Under some circumstances, Bajari and Ye (2003) admit the possibility that the competitive
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Figure 4: The Evolution of the Coe cient of Variation
model might also encompass collusion. Indeed, if cartel members scale their bids with a common
factor, the assumptions underlying the competitive model proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) remains
non-violated: the cartel can pass through the tests.
However, we can exclude in our case this bid scaling phenomenon. Imhof (2017) presents the
application of simple statistical screens to detect collusion for the Ticino case and finds that simple
statistical screens capture well the impact of the bid-rigging cartel. Figure 4 drawn from Imhof (2017)
depicts the evolution of the coe cient of variation, where the two vertical lines delimit the cartel
period. The di↵erence between the cartel and the post cartel period is eye-catching: the coe cient
of variation is significantly lower during the cartel period indicating the existence of a bid-rigging
cartel, as predicted by the variance screen (see Imhof et al., 2015; Imhof , 2017).
Yet, simple screens function only if cartel members do not scale their bids. If they scale their
bids, it is impossible to detect collusion with simple screens as shown by Imhof (2017). In sum, we
can exclude the bid scaling phenomenon for the Ticino case. Therefore, it seems realistic to consider
that a cartel can manage to pass through the tests proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) without scaling
their bids. This result is somehow pessimistic towards the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003).
Because, if one bid-rigging cartel of the worst kind may pass through the tests, how many other ones
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could there be?
Two arguments can moderate this pessimistic conclusion. First, we find comparatively better
results for the tests of the conditional independence applied to the direct cover bids sample: 69% of
the pairs fail the test. This may be a clue that the econometric tests, at least the test for the conditional
independence, perform better to find rather bilateral agreement between firms than an all-inclusive
cartel as the Ticino case. It is also worthy to notice that the test for the exchangeability performs
better than the test of the conditional independence for the cartel period. In any case, our results
strongly suggest that the requirement of the simultaneous failing of both tests is inappropriate to
classify a pair as potential cartel: only 6% of the pairs fail both tests whereas 40% of the pairs fail
one test. Even if we consider a higher risk level of 10%, only 7% of the pairs fail both tests, and 55%
of the pairs fail one test. Therefore, if in an other case half of the pairs fail one of the two tests at a 5%
standard risk level, it should be considered as su cient to alarm competition agencies concerning
potential bid-rigging cartels.
Second, the internal organization of the bid-rigging cartel can explain, why the cartel manages
to pass through the tests. Indeed, cartel members meet every week, and they discuss extensively
the bids to submit for each contract, considering criteria like firm capacity, the distance to contract
location or firm specialization. These criteria to allocate contracts among them are the cost variables,
the most used in the empirical identification of the model. Therefore, the submitted bids during the
cartel period are certainly connected with the cost variables, in some ways that allow the bid-rigging
cartel to pass through the tests proposed by Bajari with success.
However, if bids are cleverly fake, why can an alternative method, such as the screening method
proposed by Imhof et al. (2015), perform better to detect the Ticino case than the method of Bajari?
For comparison purpose, we apply the ex ante screeningmethod based on simple screens proposed by
Imhof et al. (2015) on the Ticino case. The screening method combines two simple screens, the coe -
cient of variation and the relative distance, to classify contracts as conspicuous or non-conspicuous.
We find that the screening method classifies 82% of the contracts during the cartel period as conspic-
uous. Therefore, the comparison is striking with the method of Bajari and Ye (2003): Simple screens
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produces significantly fewer negative results for the cartel period, even if the cartel members discuss
extensively the fake bids to submit.
Finally, if one competition agency wishes to enforce law and destabilize bid-rigging cartels, which
detection method should it choose in the first place? We believe that both methods may be comple-
mentary and not substitutable. The method based on simple screens provides quickly information
on potential serious bid-rigging issues. It works well to detect bid-rigging cartels, and it seems to
produce significantly fewer false negative results for the Ticino’s case compared to the method of
Bajari and Ye (2003). Moreover, its low data requirement is particularly advantageous to screen for a
high number of contracts, since it uses solely information about bids and not about costs. Bids are
easier to observe than costs, especially if we run the method ex ante, in secrecy, in order to impede
the bid-rigging cartel to react and destroy hard evidence.
However, the screening method is not based on a theoretical model as the method proposed by
Bajari and Ye (2003). Yet, the theoretical model proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) focuses on bilateral
firm interaction. In our case, the econometric tests, derived from this theoretical model, function – at
least – to detect bilateral agreements. Because there is still some competition on the market, bilateral
agreements among competitors are not the worst kind of collusion. Nevertheless, they a↵ect the
outcome of tenders and are therefore harmful. Then, if there is reason to suspect that collusion takes
rather the form of bilateral agreements and not of an all-inclusive bid-rigging cartel, as the Ticino’s
case, it should be advantageous to implement the tests proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003).
A problem arises now from the fact that bilateral colluding firms may not collude on all con-
tracts: they may partially collude on some contracts. This may be a serious problem, especially
considering the high number of possible false negative results produced by the method of Bajari and
Ye (2003). Yet, the screening method proposed by Imhof et al. (2015) can remedy to this problem of
partial collusion among contracts. Indeed, the authors propose to construct a filter based on di↵er-
ent screens to focus solely on conspicuous contracts. If there is some reason to suspect that firms
do not collude on all contracts, then the screening method proposed by Imhof et al. (2015) may help
to screen contracts the most likely to be bid-rigged. After this first selection, the investigator can
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apply the method of Bajari and Ye (2003), and test for the exchangeability and for the conditional
independence. However, requirement for the econometric tests, as for simple screens, should not be
too high. Indeed, screening methods, implemented ex ante to detect bid-rigging cartels, should not
bring the ultimate evidence to proof collusion, but they should provide solely a su cient suspicion
to open an investigation.
8 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the literature of bid-rigging detection in multiple ways. We have shown
that the detection method of Bajari and Ye (2003) produces a high number of false negative results
for the Ticino bid-rigging cartel, and we cannot explain this result with the bid scaling phenomenon.
Therefore, the Ticino bid-rigging cartel finds a way to pass through the tests, and to challenge the
competitive model used by Bajari and Ye (2003).
We have also applied both tests on the first sub-sample composed by indirect cover bids, and
we have found again that the tests produce two many negative results. Considering the severity of
bid-rigging cartel, we would have expected to detect it with the method proposed by Bajari and Ye
(2003). In contrast, we have shown that the test of the conditional independence produces results
consistent with the existence of the bid-rigging cartel for the second sub-sample, composed by the
direct cover bids. This result suggests that the method of Bajari and Ye (2003) would rather detect
bilateral agreements than all-inclusive cartels.
Then, we conclude that the high number of negative results suggests that the failure of one test
should be su cient to classify a pair of firms as potential bid-rigging cartel. Moreover, if half of the
pairs fail at least one test, it should also be su cient to alarm competition agencies to delve into it.
Finally, we have compared the methods of Bajari and Ye (2003) with the results of the screening
method developed by Imhof et al. (2015). We have found that it performs better to detect the Ticino
bid-rigging cartel. We also believe that both methods may be complementary, and we propose a way
to use the strength of both methods.
To sum up, bid-rigging cartels are a serious problem and competition agencies should be more
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proactive in order to deter and destabilize them. Detection methods are not the unique instrument
to achieve this goal, but only one instrument among a set of multiple possible actions. However, in
order to use a detection method as a valid instrument, competition agencies must be able to gauge
its performance, its strengths and its limits. Our paper contributes to treat this question concerning
detection methods for bid-rigging cartels.
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9 Appendix Table
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Table 9: Firms Descriptive Statistics
Firm Bids Win. Bids Success Rate Workers Vertical integr. Firm SH Firm 1 SH Firm 2 Contracts won Market Share
3 58 18 0.31 16 1 0 0 17’761’137.20 6%
4 143 17 0.12 45 1 0 1 17’742’856.60 6%
5 44 24 0.55 33 1 0 0 17’693’104.70 6%
6 77 11 0.14 39 1 0 0 13’498’334.30 4%
7 18 7 0.39 8 0 0 0 8’268’229.46 3%
8 125 24 0.19 35 0 1 0 21’954’142.30 7%
9 206 31 0.15 61 0 1 0 20’668’237.20 7%
10 132 21 0.16 70 0 1 0 19’278’461.80 6%
11 86 21 0.24 42 0 1 0 20’421’747.70 7%
12 58 34 0.59 41 0 1 0 26’726’938.70 9%
14 114 22 0.19 27 0 1 0 20’937’920.70 7%
15 192 34 0.18 48 0 1 0 25’287’349.40 8%
16 50 15 0.30 30 0 0 1 13’770’686.40 4%
17 143 20 0.14 36 0 1 0 16’384’310.40 5%
18 81 19 0.23 31 0 1 0 17’917’527.00 6%
19 143 21 0.15 60 0 1 0 19’971’476.70 6%
20 65 13 0.20 35 0 0 0 14’458’499.40 5%
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9.1 Test for the conditional independence
Table 10: Test for the conditional independence for the cartel period
Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(6,18) 19  0.667  3.2214
(3,24) 5  0.9718  3.0039
(23,24) 25  0.5595  2.9645
(12,17) 9  0.8198  2.8318
(8,17) 31  0.4709  2.705
(9,12) 13 0.6652 2.5363
(23,25) 13  0.6459  2.4294
(24,26) 7  0.8221  2.3265
(14,15) 34  0.3894  2.2891
(6,20) 14  0.5769  2.1818
(4,24) 21  0.4655  2.1394
(21,22) 9  0.7013  2.1308
(9,25) 5  0.8968  2.0584
(9,17) 49  0.2917  2.0379
(6,14) 24  0.4041  1.9635
(16,18) 5  0.8606  1.8323
(4,23) 17  0.4527  1.8262
(11,24) 5 0.8564 1.8097
(11,20) 9  0.6246  1.7944
(11,15) 18  0.427  1.7671
(4,17) 45  0.2657  1.7639
(17,18) 17  0.4365  1.7509
(14,19) 19  0.4017  1.7027
(4,19) 31 0.3076 1.6823
(3,11) 10  0.5456  1.6196
(22,23) 16  0.4178  1.6044
(11,14) 17  0.4031  1.5988
(4,9) 58  0.2113  1.591
(5,12) 8  0.608  1.5781
See next page
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Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(11,18) 15  0.4134  1.5233
(4,14) 36  0.2571  1.5108
(14,18) 25 0.3078 1.4922
(4,15) 51  0.212  1.4913
(6,19) 19  0.3532  1.4765
(8,18) 10  0.4987  1.4489
(3,17) 9  0.5189  1.408
(9,10) 33  0.2451  1.3704
(4,10) 31  0.2499  1.3511
(8,15) 30  0.2537  1.3475
(9,19) 34  0.2269  1.2857
(10,16) 7 0.566 1.2832
(3,9) 12 0.4033 1.2828
(16,17) 8  0.5064  1.2474
(4,18) 24 0.2541 1.1904
(15,24) 9  0.437  1.1476
(3,20) 6 0.5748 1.1339
(4,22) 7 0.5002 1.0992
(22,24) 13  0.3289  1.0801
(8,10) 16  0.286  1.0607
(21,24) 9  0.4076  1.06
(15,16) 9  0.3961  1.0264
(4,25) 8  0.4196  1.0001
(6,9) 29  0.1926  0.9946
(17,21) 5 0.6028 0.9866
(11,17) 14 0.2854 0.9737
(10,15) 32  0.1774  0.9653
(15,19) 31  0.1803  0.9646
(3,18) 14  0.2781  0.9474
(3,10) 6  0.4898  0.928
(5,19) 5  0.5661  0.9076
(6,17) 24 0.1945 0.9029
See next page
43
Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(14,20) 15 0.2466 0.8723
(17,20) 29  0.1671  0.8602
(6,11) 15 0.2416 0.8538
(5,20) 6  0.4531  0.8464
(4,11) 21  0.1878  0.8061
(10,17) 24  0.171  0.7914
(3,15) 12 0.2575 0.7903
(6,15) 26  0.161  0.7791
(17,19) 26  0.1583  0.7658
(21,23) 11  0.2601  0.7529
(15,21) 5  0.4868  0.7522
(20,24) 6  0.4058  0.7457
(4,20) 31  0.1378  0.734
(18,24) 9 0.2848 0.7173
(10,20) 18  0.1718  0.672
(8,11) 10 0.2485 0.6715
(18,20) 12 0.2053 0.6248
(9,14) 38 0.102 0.6058
(9,24) 10 0.2204 0.5928
(12,19) 5  0.3875  0.5783
(17,24) 10  0.2132  0.5727
(8,24) 5  0.3642  0.5398
(16,20) 6 0.301 0.5379
(18,23) 5  0.3626  0.5372
(3,4) 13 0.1655 0.5283
(14,17) 25  0.1121  0.5282
(6,8) 15 0.1512 0.5279
(8,14) 19  0.1291  0.5193
(9,11) 19  0.1256  0.5049
(16,19) 5  0.3342  0.4915
(6,24) 6 0.2743 0.4875
(19,20) 18  0.1243  0.4838
See next page
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Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(15,17) 45  0.0729  0.4735
(12,20) 5  0.3221  0.4723
(9,15) 62  0.0595  0.4576
(4,21) 9  0.1772  0.4387
(19,23) 6 0.2354 0.4155
(8,19) 18  0.1049  0.4076
(14,16) 5 0.273 0.3961
(9,16) 10 0.1486 0.396
(12,15) 10 0.143 0.381
(15,20) 27 0.0753 0.3697
(6,16) 8 0.1638 0.3696
(9,18) 22  0.0837  0.3656
(4,8) 32  0.0669  0.3606
(8,16) 7  0.1765  0.3568
(15,18) 21 0.0817 0.3473
(10,18) 11  0.1157  0.3288
(3,14) 14 0.095 0.3159
(24,25) 5  0.2158  0.31
(6,23) 6 0.1747 0.3058
(10,11) 9  0.1195  0.2941
(14,24) 8  0.1289  0.2898
(10,19) 23  0.0631  0.2827
(5,17) 6  0.1594  0.2785
(23,26) 9  0.1057  0.2599
(6,10) 15 0.0735 0.2549
(10,14) 16 0.069 0.2493
(22,25) 5  0.1697  0.2423
(8,9) 33  0.0441  0.2417
(4,16) 10  0.0881  0.2336
(17,23) 6 0.1321 0.2302
(5,9) 8  0.0929  0.2083
(3,8) 7  0.0865  0.1734
See next page
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Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(18,19) 9 0.0695 0.1706
(9,21) 7  0.0692  0.1387
(3,6) 7  0.0616  0.1233
(8,20) 20 0.0176 0.0725
(4,6) 34  0.0095  0.0528
(9,20) 30 0.007 0.0365
(5,15) 6 0.0137 0.0238
(11,19) 8  0.01  0.0223
46
Table 11: Test for the conditional independence for the post cartel period
Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(4,9) 13  0.7623  3.1676
(6,8) 6 0.926 2.8227
(15,19) 12  0.673  2.4487
(9,15) 18  0.5396  2.3378
(4,8) 9  0.7177  2.2117
(8,9) 11 0.6227 2.0632
(4,6) 9  0.6683  1.9784
(4,16) 5  0.8685  1.8768
(9,18) 5 0.8682 1.8746
(8,19) 8  0.666  1.7968
(14,19) 5 0.8029 1.5653
(10,17) 10  0.5271  1.5508
(10,15) 6  0.6876  1.4609
(6,15) 7  0.6204  1.4514
(6,14) 7 0.5959 1.3735
(6,10) 9  0.4926  1.3215
(6,19) 8 0.5055 1.2449
(16,19) 6  0.6038  1.2108
(4,15) 10 0.4023 1.1282
(9,17) 18  0.2665  1.0577
(14,16) 6 0.499 0.949
(16,17) 8  0.3692  0.8665
(4,18) 5  0.5446  0.8635
(10,14) 5  0.5317  0.8379
(6,16) 6 0.4229 0.7816
(9,14) 9  0.2988  0.755
(8,16) 5 0.472 0.725
(4,14) 6  0.3882  0.7096
(14,15) 5  0.4514  0.6879
(4,19) 8  0.298  0.6873
(8,10) 7  0.2996  0.6181
See next page
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Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(8,17) 11  0.2106  0.6048
(14,17) 9  0.2293  0.5719
(9,16) 6  0.3066  0.5486
(4,24) 5  0.3674  0.545
(4,17) 13  0.1288  0.4098
(15,17) 15  0.1169  0.4069
(15,16) 5 0.2616 0.3787
(17,18) 5  0.2315  0.3334
(6,9) 12  0.1081  0.3257
(10,19) 8  0.1388  0.3123
(9,10) 12  0.0576  0.1731
(6,17) 11 0.0559 0.1584
(9,19) 12 0.0527 0.1582
(17,19) 13 0.0442 0.1398
(4,10) 8 0.0264 0.059
(8,15) 9  0.0221  0.0541
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Table 12: Test for the conditional independence only for the cover bids
Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(6,14) 20  0.7212  3.7526
(6,18) 12  0.7717  3.0736
(4,22) 5 0.9659 2.8673
(4,23) 8  0.8519  2.824
(4,17) 37  0.437  2.7318
(11,20) 7  0.8682  2.6516
(9,15) 50 0.3498 2.5038
(10,17) 17  0.5791  2.4737
(14,19) 17  0.541  2.2656
(9,12) 5 0.9175 2.2246
(6,20) 14  0.5769  2.1818
(23,26) 5  0.9024  2.0997
(22,23) 7  0.7717  2.049
(11,18) 12  0.5861  2.015
(14,18) 18 0.4578 1.9151
(11,14) 15  0.4947  1.8785
(4,19) 24 0.382 1.8438
(9,14) 35 0.3124 1.8283
(15,18) 14 0.4966 1.8067
(11,15) 14  0.4943  1.7968
(9,19) 30  0.3318  1.7917
(16,17) 5  0.8457  1.7546
(17,19) 24  0.3639  1.7477
(8,10) 12  0.5127  1.6991
(3,17) 5  0.8246  1.6561
(4,14) 31  0.2983  1.6279
(6,11) 12 0.4811 1.5731
(4,16) 7  0.6508  1.5534
(17,20) 26  0.2959  1.4628
(8,15) 23  0.312  1.4433
(17,18) 14  0.4093  1.4418
See next page
49
Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(11,17) 13 0.408 1.3698
(8,9) 28  0.2557  1.3076
(6,9) 24  0.276  1.2986
(10,16) 7 0.566 1.2832
(15,20) 24 0.269 1.2639
(4,9) 50  0.1683  1.1648
(8,17) 23  0.247  1.1279
(8,18) 7  0.5039  1.109
(9,11) 16  0.2944  1.094
(18,19) 6 0.5587 1.0927
(10,15) 25 0.217 1.034
(4,24) 17  0.2599  0.9952
(6,8) 12  0.3148  0.9775
(3,11) 6  0.51  0.9747
(10,18) 6 0.4878 0.9234
(4,10) 23 0.2033 0.9221
(4,8) 23  0.2029  0.92
(22,24) 10  0.334  0.9189
(9,18) 16 0.248 0.9133
(14,20) 15 0.2466 0.8723
(23,25) 5  0.5408  0.856
(4,6) 28 0.1644 0.8295
(23,24) 9  0.3143  0.7968
(6,15) 24  0.1581  0.7306
(8,11) 9 0.2866 0.7221
(10,14) 13 0.2142 0.6879
(6,10) 14 0.2015 0.6776
(6,19) 17 0.174 0.6576
(9,16) 8  0.2847  0.6546
(10,20) 15 0.1831 0.6414
(3,14) 10  0.2366  0.6382
(14,17) 24  0.1383  0.638
See next page
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Pair of f irms N Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(4,20) 27 0.1271 0.6262
(15,16) 7  0.3014  0.622
(15,17) 38  0.1016  0.6032
(4,18) 19 0.1445 0.582
(18,20) 10 0.2132 0.5728
(3,4) 9 0.2282 0.5689
(16,20) 6 0.301 0.5379
(6,24) 5 0.3451 0.509
(3,18) 8  0.2146  0.4873
(19,20) 18  0.1243  0.4838
(6,17) 23 0.0961 0.4311
(3,6) 6 0.2314 0.4081
(9,20) 27 0.0789 0.3872
(11,19) 6  0.218  0.3838
(10,19) 21  0.0852  0.3623
(17,24) 5 0.229 0.3296
(8,20) 17  0.0656  0.246
(19,23) 5 0.1716 0.2451
(6,16) 6 0.1391 0.2424
(9,17) 41  0.0393  0.2421
(14,24) 5 0.166 0.2369
(3,15) 8 0.0983 0.2205
(8,14) 16  0.0568  0.2049
(9,10) 25  0.0356  0.167
(15,19) 27  0.0311  0.1522
(8,19) 15 0.0418 0.145
(3,9) 7 0.0658 0.1317
(14,15) 29  0.0106  0.054
(18,24) 7  0.0239  0.0478
(4,15) 41 0.0039 0.0237
(10,11) 6 0.005 0.0087
(4,11) 16  0.0006  0.0022
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Table 13: Test for the conditional independence only for the direct cover bids
Pair of f irms N Direct Cover Bids Pearson Coef f . Z   statistic
(9,15) 62 12  0.8866  4.2174
(4,9) 58 8  0.9434  3.9536
(9,17) 49 8  0.9385  3.8579
(4,10) 31 8  0.9317  3.7368
(4,15) 51 10  0.8783  3.6201
(10,17) 24 7  0.9403  3.4813
(10,18) 11 5  0.9834  3.3822
(6,18) 19 7  0.9321  3.3483
(10,15) 32 7  0.9294  3.3079
(8,15) 30 7  0.9243  3.2355
(23,25) 13 8  0.877  3.0469
(23,24) 25 16  0.6826  3.0069
(9,10) 33 8  0.8728  3.0069
(8,17) 31 8  0.8668  2.9518
(4,23) 17 9  0.8342  2.9438
(6,9) 29 5  0.9672  2.8949
(14,15) 34 5  0.9602  2.7556
(4,6) 34 6  0.9181  2.7311
(9,18) 22 6  0.9141  2.688
(4,11) 21 5  0.9554  2.6733
(4,8) 32 9  0.7831  2.5801
(4,17) 45 8  0.8148  2.5517
(4,14) 36 5  0.9424  2.4877
(15,18) 21 7  0.8098  2.2529
(15,17) 45 7  0.7483  1.9382
(3,9) 12 5 0.8571 1.8135
(17,24) 10 5  0.8332  1.695
(22,23) 16 9  0.5916  1.666
(9,12) 13 8 0.5261 1.3075
(8,9) 33 5  0.6101  1.0028
(4,18) 24 5  0.5846  0.9467
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(21,23) 11 8 0.2557 0.5847
(3,18) 14 6  0.3209  0.5762
(14,18) 25 7 0.2372 0.4836
(12,15) 10 6 0.1019 0.1771
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9.2 Test for the exchangeability of the bids
Table 14: Test for the exchangeability of the bids for the cartel period
Pair of Firms N F   Statistics Df . P  Value
(9,12) 13 9.0016 (4,534) 0.0000
(5,19) 5 6.927 (4,534) 0.0000
(5,9) 8 6.852 (4,534) 0.0000
(12,19) 5 6.2252 (4,534) 0.0001
(12,15) 10 5.7752 (4,534) 0.0002
(3,9) 12 4.9744 (4,534) 0.0006
(3,10) 6 4.6618 (4,534) 0.001
(5,15) 6 4.6344 (4,534) 0.0011
(3,4) 13 4.4522 (4,534) 0.0015
(5,20) 6 4.4016 (4,534) 0.0017
(4,8) 32 4.045 (4,534) 0.0031
(12,17) 9 3.7659 (4,534) 0.005
(8,9) 33 3.7452 (4,534) 0.0051
(8,17) 31 3.5372 (4,534) 0.0074
(3,15) 12 3.4913 (4,534) 0.0079
(9,18) 22 3.4605 (4,534) 0.0084
(12,20) 5 3.3704 (4,534) 0.0097
(8,24) 5 3.3377 (4,534) 0.0103
(8,15) 30 3.2351 (4,534) 0.0122
(10,11) 9 3.2208 (4,534) 0.0125
(4,11) 21 3.1885 (4,534) 0.0133
(9,11) 19 3.1263 (4,534) 0.0147
(3,8) 7 3.1031 (4,534) 0.0153
(4,18) 24 3.062 (4,534) 0.0164
(3,17) 9 2.9938 (4,534) 0.0184
(23,25) 13 2.9051 (4,534) 0.0213
(10,17) 24 2.8342 (4,534) 0.024
(10,18) 11 2.8341 (4,534) 0.024
(4,23) 17 2.8207 (4,534) 0.0246
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(23,26) 9 2.8158 (4,534) 0.0248
(3,20) 6 2.7972 (4,534) 0.0255
(8,20) 20 2.7305 (4,534) 0.0285
(18,19) 9 2.712 (4,534) 0.0294
(9,21) 7 2.7031 (4,534) 0.0298
(8,18) 10 2.6991 (4,534) 0.03
(9,24) 10 2.5771 (4,534) 0.0367
(19,23) 6 2.5283 (4,534) 0.0398
(5,17) 6 2.4986 (4,534) 0.0418
(17,23) 6 2.4587 (4,534) 0.0446
(6,23) 6 2.4348 (4,534) 0.0464
(9,17) 49 2.4317 (4,534) 0.0466
(14,18) 25 2.397 (4,534) 0.04933
(4,17) 45 2.3517 (4,534) 0.0531
(8,10) 16 2.3232 (4,534) 0.0556
(6,24) 6 2.2839 (4,534) 0.0593
(24,26) 7 2.2576 (4,534) 0.0618
(18,20) 12 2.2523 (4,534) 0.0624
(6,8) 15 2.2275 (4,534) 0.0649
(11,19) 8 2.1581 (4,534) 0.0725
(17,19) 26 2.1227 (4,534) 0.0767
(15,21) 5 2.119 (4,534) 0.0772
(11,15) 18 2.0871 (4,534) 0.0812
(24,25) 5 2.082 (4,534) 0.0819
(20,24) 6 2.0247 (4,534) 0.0897
(4,19) 31 2.0179 (4,534) 0.0906
(8,11) 10 2.0086 (4,534) 0.092
(4,21) 9 2.0037 (4,534) 0.0927
(17,24) 10 1.9348 (4,534) 0.1033
(15,18) 21 1.9338 (4,534) 0.1035
(6,18) 19 1.9319 (4,534) 0.1038
(4,22) 7 1.8959 (4,534) 0.1098
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(11,24) 5 1.8057 (4,534) 0.1263
(17,21) 5 1.7372 (4,534) 0.1404
(3,6) 7 1.7036 (4,534) 0.1478
(9,14) 38 1.6967 (4,534) 0.1493
(17,18) 17 1.6456 (4,534) 0.1614
(22,23) 16 1.6339 (4,534) 0.1643
(3,14) 14 1.6058 (4,534) 0.1714
(14,24) 8 1.5417 (4,534) 0.1887
(15,17) 45 1.5251 (4,534) 0.1935
(9,25) 5 1.5135 (4,534) 0.1968
(21,22) 9 1.5106 (4,534) 0.1977
(8,14) 19 1.5085 (4,534) 0.1983
(9,19) 34 1.492 (4,534) 0.2032
(15,24) 9 1.4854 (4,534) 0.2052
(4,6) 34 1.4818 (4,534) 0.2063
(4,25) 8 1.4536 (4,534) 0.2151
(8,19) 18 1.4308 (4,534) 0.22243
(4,14) 36 1.4074 (4,534) 0.2302
(8,16) 7 1.4047 (4,534) 0.2311
(11,20) 9 1.3945 (4,534) 0.2346
(3,11) 10 1.3899 (4,534) 0.23612
(10,14) 16 1.375 (4,534) 0.2413
(22,25) 5 1.365 (4,534) 0.2449
(11,17) 14 1.3607 (4,534) 0.2464
(11,14) 17 1.3123 (4,534) 0.2642
(4,24) 21 1.3105 (4,534) 0.2649
(16,18) 5 1.2626 (4,534) 0.2836
(4,9) 58 1.2286 (4,534) 0.2976
(14,17) 25 1.2174 (4,534) 0.3023
(5,12) 8 1.1416 (4,534) 0.336
(10,19) 23 1.1215 (4,534) 0.3455
(3,18) 14 1.1148 (4,534) 0.3487
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(6,17) 24 1.0585 (4,534) 0.3764
(3,24) 5 1.0113 (4,534) 0.401
(6,10) 15 0.9976 (4,534) 0.4083
(9,15) 62 0.9811 (4,534) 0.4173
(18,24) 9 0.9753 (4,534) 0.4205
(22,24) 13 0.9731 (4,534) 0.4217
(18,23) 5 0.9612 (4,534) 0.4284
(6,9) 29 0.9598 (4,534) 0.4291
(19,20) 18 0.8989 (4,534) 0.4643
(14,15) 34 0.881 (4,534) 0.475
(17,20) 29 0.8448 (4,534) 0.4972
(21,23) 11 0.7895 (4,534) 0.5323
(15,19) 31 0.7231 (4,534) 0.5764
(10,15) 32 0.7183 (4,534) 0.5797
(4,15) 51 0.7002 (4,534) 0.5921
(4,20) 31 0.6913 (4,534) 0.5982
(9,10) 33 0.6701 (4,534) 0.6129
(16,17) 8 0.6629 (4,534) 0.618
(9,16) 10 0.6416 (4,534) 0.633
(14,19) 19 0.6354 (4,534) 0.6375
(4,16) 10 0.6337 (4,534) 0.6387
(6,19) 19 0.6212 (4,534) 0.6476
(6,15) 26 0.5975 (4,534) 0.6646
(6,11) 15 0.5814 (4,534) 0.6762
(10,20) 18 0.5728 (4,534) 0.6825
(23,24) 25 0.5511 (4,534) 0.6983
(14,20) 15 0.5138 (4,534) 0.7257
(15,20) 27 0.4836 (4,534) 0.7478
(4,10) 31 0.4759 (4,534) 0.7535
(21,24) 9 0.4731 (4,534) 0.7555
(11,18) 15 0.463 (4,534) 0.7629
(16,20) 6 0.4619 (4,534) 0.7637
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(6,20) 14 0.4364 (4,534) 0.7824
(14,16) 5 0.4261 (4,534) 0.7899
(16,19) 5 0.4194 (4,534) 0.7947
(10,16) 7 0.3396 (4,534) 0.8513
(6,14) 24 0.3017 (4,534) 0.8769
(6,16) 8 0.2129 (4,534) 0.9313
(15,16) 9 0.1817 (4,534) 0.9479
(9,20) 30 0.0617 (4,534) 0.993
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Table 15: Test for the exchangeability of the bids for the post cartel period
Pair of Firms N F   Statistics Df . P  Value
(8,16) 5 3.1582 (4,91) 0.0177
(10,19) 8 2.7524 (4,91) 0.0327
(16,19) 6 2.5916 (4,91) 0.0417
(9,14) 9 2.5847 (4,91) 0.0422
(10,14) 5 2.3966 (4,91) 0.056
(14,17) 9 2.1108 (4,91) 0.0858
(14,19) 5 2.1022 (4,91) 0.0869
(17,19) 13 2.0748 (4,91) 0.0905
(6,16) 6 1.9251 (4,91) 0.113
(6,9) 12 1.777 (4,91) 0.1403
(6,10) 9 1.7419 (4,91) 0.1476
(6,14) 7 1.7076 (4,91) 0.1551
(14,15) 5 1.4598 (4,91) 0.221
(6,19) 8 1.4532 (4,91) 0.223
(9,16) 6 1.4232 (4,91) 0.2326
(8,15) 9 1.4165 (4,91) 0.2348
(4,14) 6 1.3734 (4,91) 0.2494
(6,8) 6 1.3486 (4,91) 0.2581
(15,19) 12 1.331 (4,91) 0.2645
(9,10) 12 1.167 (4,91) 0.3307
(8,9) 11 1.1366 (4,91) 0.3444
(8,17) 11 1.1338 (4,91) 0.3456
(8,10) 7 1.0795 (4,91) 0.3714
(16,17) 8 1.0779 (4,91) 0.3722
(14,16) 6 1.0256 (4,91) 0.3985
(6,17) 11 1.0076 (4,91) 0.4078
(10,15) 6 0.9327 (4,91) 0.4487
(4,18) 5 0.9244 (4,91) 0.4534
(4,16) 5 0.9222 (4,91) 0.4547
(9,19) 12 0.8061 (4,91) 0.5245
(17,18) 5 0.8025 (4,91) 0.5267
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(4,19) 8 0.7878 (4,91) 0.5361
(9,15) 18 0.7516 (4,91) 0.5595
(9,18) 5 0.72568 (4,91) 0.5767
(6,15) 7 0.6854 (4,91) 0.6039
(4,6) 9 0.6748 (4,91) 0.6112
(8,19) 8 0.5898 (4,91) 0.6709
(4,24) 5 0.5735 (4,91) 0.6826
(15,16) 5 0.4881 (4,91) 0.7444
(10,17) 10 0.4051 (4,91) 0.8045
(15,17) 15 0.3887 (4,91) 0.8162
(4,10) 8 0.3569 (4,91) 0.8386
(9,17) 18 0.2711 (4,91) 0.8959
(4,15) 10 0.2581 (4,91) 0.904
(4,17) 13 0.2563 (4,91) 0.9052
(4,9) 13 0.2223 (4,91) 0.9254
(4,8) 9 0.193 (4,91) 0.9415
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Table 16: Test for the exchangeability of the bids for the cover bids
Pair of Firms N F   Statistics Df . P  Value
(22,23) 7 8.0317 (4,406) 0.0000
(4,23) 8 5.1874 (4,406) 0.0004
(23,24) 9 3.9651 (4,406) 0.0036
(8,15) 23 3.9448 (4,406) 0.0037
(4,22) 5 3.8624 (4,406) 0.0043
(6,9) 24 3.5694 (4,406) 0.0071
(8,17) 23 3.5612 (4,406) 0.0072
(6,15) 24 3.4618 (4,406) 0.0085
(4,6) 28 3.3789 (4,406) 0.098
(8,9) 28 3.3546 (4,406) 0.0102
(6,17) 23 3.3136 (4,406) 0.0109
(6,10) 14 3.2137 (4,406) 0.0129
(6,24) 5 3.192 (4,406) 0.0134
(4,8) 23 3.1462 (4,406) 0.0145
(23,25) 5 3.0913 (4,406) 0.0159
(8,14) 16 3.0425 (4,406) 0.0172
(6,8) 12 2.8831 (4,406) 0.0224
(6,19) 17 2.6106 (4,406) 0.0351
(4,24) 17 2.4795 (4,406) 0.0435
(23,26) 5 2.3597 (4,406) 0.0528
(9,24) 8 2.3432 (4,406) 0.0543
(8,10) 12 2.1611 (4,406) 0.0727
(15,19) 27 2.1508 (4,406) 0.0739
(10,11) 6 2.1066 (4,406) 0.0792
(19,23) 5 2.0967 (4,406) 0.0805
(3,6) 6 2.0394 (4,406) 0.0881
(9,11) 16 1.9982 (4,406) 0.094
(17,19) 24 1.9726 (4,406) 0.0979
(17,24) 5 1.9536 (4,406) 0.1008
(10,17) 17 1.9371 (4,406) 0.1034
(9,19) 30 1.9085 (4,406) 0.1082
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(4,11) 16 1.9012 (4,406) 0.1094
(9,17) 41 1.8978 (4,406) 0.11
(4,19) 24 1.8688 (4,406) 0.115
(3,17) 5 1.813 (4,406) 0.1254
(11,15) 14 1.7788 (4,406) 0.1322
(8,20) 17 1.7431 (4,406) 0.1396
(10,19) 21 1.6728 (4,406) 0.1554
(11,17) 13 1.665 (4,406) 0.1573
(10,14) 13 1.5945 (4,406) 0.1749
(6,18) 12 1.5817 (4,406) 0.1783
(3,11) 6 1.5572 (4,406) 0.1849
(6,14) 20 1.4708 (4,406) 0.2102
(22,24) 10 1.4663 (4,406) 0.2116
(4,17) 37 1.3989 (4,406) 0.2335
(6,11) 12 1.2937 (4,406) 0.2718
(8,19) 15 1.2209 (4,406) 0.3013
(15,17) 38 1.2067 (4,406) 0.3074
(9,14) 35 1.1768 (4,406) 0.3204
(17,20) 26 1.1504 (4,406) 0.3324
(11,19) 6 1.1079 (4,406) 0.3523
(14,19) 17 1.0885 (4,406) 0.3617
(11,14) 15 1.085 (4,406) 0.3635
(14,24) 5 1.0368 (4,406) 0.3879
(3,4) 9 1.0099 (4,406) 0.402
(14,17) 24 0.9961 (4,406) 0.4094
(14,20) 15 0.9925 (4,406) 0.4114
(3,14) 10 0.9771 (4,406) 0.4198
(9,15) 50 0.9647 (4,406) 0.4267
(3,15) 8 0.9431 (4,406) 0.4389
(10,15) 25 0.9156 (4,406) 0.4547
(3,18) 8 0.9111 (4,406) 0.4573
(4,14) 31 0.9025 (4,406) 0.4624
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(19,20) 18 0.8946 (4,406) 0.4671
(10,18) 6 0.8654 (4,406) 0.4847
(3,9) 7 0.8555 (4,406) 0.4908
(6,20) 14 0.8272 (4,406) 0.5084
(11,20) 7 0.7853 (4,406) 0.5352
(16,17) 5 0.7776 (4,406) 0.5402
(9,12) 5 0.7451 (4,406) 0.5617
(8,11) 9 0.7371 (4,406) 0.5671
(8,18) 7 0.6726 (4,406) 0.6113
(15,20) 24 0.6085 (4,406) 0.6567
(4,18) 19 0.5857 (4,406) 0.6732
(9,18) 16 0.5842 (4,406) 0.6743
(6,16) 6 0.5608 (4,406) 0.6913
(14,15) 29 0.5279 (4,406) 0.7153
(18,20) 10 0.5222 (4,406) 0.7194
(10,16) 7 0.5192 (4,406) 0.7217
(18,19) 6 0.483 (4,406) 0.7483
(9,20) 27 0.4697 (4,406) 0.758
(11,18) 12 0.4538 (4,406) 0.7696
(10,20) 15 0.4306 (4,406) 0.7865
(18,24) 7 0.4223 (4,406) 0.7926
(17,18) 14 0.4214 (4,406) 0.7932
(4,20) 27 0.392 (4,406) 0.8144
(15,18) 14 0.376 (4,406) 0.8258
(9,10) 25 0.3681 (4,406) 0.8313
(4,10) 23 0.3285 (4,406) 0.8588
(4,16) 7 0.2957 (4,406) 0.8807
(9,16) 8 0.2726 (4,406) 0.8956
(14,18) 18 0.2513 (4,406) 0.9088
(15,16) 7 0.2087 (4,406) 0.9335
(16,20) 6 0.2026 (4,406) 0.9369
(4,15) 41 0.1809 (4,406) 0.9483
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(4,9) 50 0.084 (4,406) 0.9873
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